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FOREWORD
Since its inception as a state, Russia has been both a
European and an Asian power. Although Russia today, as was true
during much of its history, is torn by an identity crisis over
where it belongs, its elites have never renounced Russia's vital
interests in Asia and the belief that it should be recognized as
a great power there. However, that belief and Moscow's ability to
sustain it are now under threat, due, as Dr. Stephen Blank's
thorough analysis informs us, to the ongoing failures of Russian
policymakers to come to grips with changed Russian and Asian
realities.
At the same time, this aspect of Russian policy has been
neglected in American assessments of Russia. This is a serious
shortcoming, because, in Dr. Blank's view, Russia's Asian
policies, viewed in their full breadth, are important signs of
present and future trends concerning its behavior at home and in
the wider world. Those policies are also significant as Asia's
importance in world affairs rises. We ignore the threatening
situation facing Russia, and Moscow's failure to adjust to those
threats, only at our own peril. The growing concern over Russian
arms transfers to China, a subject addressed in the study, is
only one sign of unexpected negative trends that might work
against U.S. interests if we continue to neglect Asian aspects of
Russia's global behavior and policy.
Accordingly, this study seeks to enlighten readers as to the
importance of Asia in Russian policy and to stimulate public
awareness and debate on these important issues for U.S. policy.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Russia historically has been a major power in Asia. Yet
increasingly it is being marginalized in Asian security issues,
especially by the United States. For example, the new U.S. peace
program for Korea omits any Russian participation. Thus Russia
faces the threat of a steady erosion of its Asiatic position. The
reasons for this process have much to do with the Russian state's
structural incapacity for conducting a coherent Asian strategy,
and the manifestations of this incapacity threaten to continue
the decline of Russia's position in Asia.
The Yeltsin administration has not succeeded in creating a
coherent policy process that is coordinated by regular and
legalized policymaking institutions. Nor does it speak with one
voice. President Boris Yeltsin has consistently championed a
system of government that has disorganized institutions,
prevented coherence in policymaking, deliberately fostered
institutional discord among his officials, and undermined
prospects for effective democratic control of the armed forces.
He has also allowed a process whereby private sectors, interest
groups, and factions have been able to take over state assets or
policy processes and make policy on their own and exclusively for
their own interests, without any consideration of Russian
interests.
Due to these processes of "deinstitutionalization" and
privatization of the state, Russia's Asian policies are
essentially the subject of a free-for-all where rival factions
contend among each other for preference and access. It is not
surprising that in such an environment it proved impossible to
arrive at normalization with Japan in 1992, since the armed
forces and conservative forces could and did successfully
coalesce and publicly oppose the government's policy with
impunity. Thus the inability of the state to overcome the
devolution of power to regional interest groups who can unite
with the armed forces perpetuates an anti-Western orientation in
Russian politics, preserves the economic poverty of the Far East,
and leads to a joint anti-Western strategy with China. This antiWestern strategy also perpetuates the state's structural
weaknesses.
These weaknesses not only undermine the center's ability to
govern, formulate, and implement policy, they also erode the
foundations of control over regional governments. While central
governmental policy is adamantly pro-Chinese, in the Russian Far
East the government has fallen into the hands of a regional gang-not too strong a word--that successfully conducts a loud and
xenophobic anti-China policy against Moscow's express wishes. The
erosion of control over obstreperous provinces is a sign both of
weak central authority and of a failure to secure the economic
revival of these areas. Central policy discriminates against
Russia's Asian provinces, but no less telling is the failure to
maximize these provinces' potential for joining the booming Asia-

Pacific economy. As Asian economies grow, these regions could be
pushed into their sphere of economic influence because Moscow has
shown it cannot aid or govern them. This process could, in turn,
trigger a wholesale retrenchment of effective (as opposed to
nominal) Russian power in Asia where large swathes of Russian
territory come under the effective economic, if not political,
control of states like China.
At the same time, Russia's arms producers are carrying out
their own policy of selling arms and technology to China and
presumably elsewhere. Arms sellers are desperate to sell because
Russia's armed forces cannot buy their production and would go
under without arms sales. They constitute a formidable lobby,
enjoying broad governmental support and access to foreign
currency. Thus they and other individuals with access either to
technology or weapons have been able to sell either weapons or
technologies abroad on their own and force the state to make
peace with these faits accomplis. They are selling weapons to
China, South Korea, India, Malaysia, and anyone else who would
buy them. Arms sellers are also pushing these sales regardless of
the fact that large sectors of the military view China as
Russia's main military rival, or that the other recipients of
these weapons could easily become China's enemies, forcing Russia
into a choice between them.
The ability of arms sellers to get their way also has
allowed China to get its way in the military aspects of the
relationship with Russia, turning Russia into the demandeur who
needs China more than China needs it, and must therefore pay
China for its support. Thus the danger in Russia's growing
friendship with China, which is approaching the nature of an
alliance and where that word has already figured in public and
military discussions of the relationship, is that the entente
with China becomes a way for China to exploit Russia for its
benefit. Russia would then be the ultimate loser in this
relationship, not the beneficiary of an enhanced strategic
potential. Russia and China are following an openly anti-American
course of action and policy; they agree on all main issues in
Asia (as Russian diplomats tell us); and Moscow supports Beijing
in Southeast Asia. Accordingly, the failure to devise a coherent
policy process and state control threatens Russia with being
reduced to following China's strategic interests to the detriment
of its own national interests. But since Russia is alienating
Japan and South Korea by its wayward economic policies and
strange security policies, like trying to cozy up to both
Pyongyang and Seoul, it lacks any alternative source of political
support or capital in Asia.
In this connection, it is obvious that the Russian
Federation lacks any clear concept of international economic
policy to develop its own Asian provinces, or the means to
implement one. Thus those regions are falling into crisis and are
kept in a state of colonial dependence on Moscow while external
possibilities for support are minimized. This policy can only

breed more local political disaffection and further undermine
Moscow's ability to bring those areas into a modern economy
integrated with the heartland of Russia.
Finally, Russia's military strategy for the area has also
failed to come to terms with reality. Military planners are
demanding forces far in excess of Russia's capabilities and are
still wedded to anti-American and anti-Japanese scenarios that
fall too quickly into either oceanic or global conventional and
nuclear war scenarios. Yet at the same time as they advocate such
postures and look warily at China, they cannot modernize their
forces, both for financial reasons and because China would look
askance. The failure to harmonize interests or goals with means
leads to the continuing degradation of all of Russia's Asian
military forces. Russia cannot afford either to maintain or
withdraw its current Asian based forces. And in the absence of a
coherent economic policy, the weakening of military power means
that Russia is losing its ability to influence regional economic,
political, and military trends in Asia.
It may not be wise on our part to marginalize Russia as an
Asian state, but it must be admitted that Russia is doing it to
herself and that the causes are largely internal. Only Moscow can
overcome this debilitating process, but there are few signs that
this is happening or will happen, and few signs that we are
sensitive to the tremendous implications of collapsing Russian
power in Asia.

WHY RUSSIAN POLICY IS FAILING IN ASIA
Introduction.
Russia was busy in Asia throughout 1996. In April 1996
President Boris Yeltsin concluded a highly successful summit with
China. Earlier in 1996 Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov held
important talks with the Chinese and Indian Foreign Ministers,
and former Defense Minister Pavel Grachev held important talks
with Japan's Minister of Defense immediately after the summit in
Beijing. These meetings indicate that Russia still attaches great
importance to its position in Asia.
Nevertheless, that position is in serious danger of erosion,
and Russia is already being marginalized on major Asian security
issues. This situation is closely related to trends in Russian
domestic and foreign policy which, if unchecked, could further
undermine Russia's standing in the Asia-Pacific region.
Russia's weakness is most evident on the Korean peninsula.
When U.S. President Bill Clinton and South Korean President Kim
Young Sam announced a new four-power plan to initiate
negotiations for a Korean peace treaty in April 1996, they
conspicuously omitted Russia from their plan. Since then, Seoul
and Washington have likewise ignored Moscow's vigorous protests.1
Nor have Japan, China, and North Korea publicly supported Russia.
Indeed, North Korea's ambassador to Russia said his government
saw no need for Russian participation in peace talks. Instead,
Pyongyang preferred talking only to Washington.2 This rebuff came
despite Russia's recent initiative to upgrade its ties with North
Korea and to demonstrate a more even-handed approach to Korean
issues.3 But Russia's failed initiatives toward Pyongyang led to
Seoul's open unhappiness with Russian policy.4 Thus, while it is
unclear what Russia has gained in Pyongyang, Moscow has
jeopardized its sizable and growing economic relationship with
South Korea.
Earlier in 1994, Russian diplomats conceded that the
resolution of North Korea's nuclear gambit highlighted Russia's
"passivity" in the North Korean-U.S. talks and in Korean affairs
in general.5 Experts and diplomats share the general perception
of Russia's passivity, and this perception reflects their common
fear that Russia is increasingly marginal to Asia and that
Russia's economic-political crisis could have dangerous
implications.6
Though this notion of Russia's marginality to Asia offends
Moscow, it illuminates Russia's absence from Asia's economicpolitical transformation. As other states create trade blocs and
deeply integrated linkages, Russia stands relatively aloof or is
still excluded from them.7 Only recently has Russia joined the
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the
Pacific (ESCAP) and applied to join the Asia-Pacific Economic

Cooperation (APEC). But those steps cannot compensate for missing
Asia's economic revolution. In 1994, Russia's Asian trade was
only 1 percent of Asia's international trade, and the volume of
Sino-Russian trade fell 30 percent.8 While the latter figure has
rebounded, compared to its potential, Russia still plays only a
minor role in Asia. For example, Russia was not invited to the
1996 Euro-Asian economic summit in Bangkok, a sure sign of the
real state of affairs.9
Continuing aloofness from Asia excludes Russia from Asian
and global roles commensurate with its size and potential. The
main explanation for Russia's marginalization lies in the
domestic basis for Russian policymaking. For Russia to succeed in
Asia, it must develop long-term, coherent, and coordinated
policies to maximize its regional, political, and economic
presence. Russia also must move beyond exporting raw materials
and military goods in order to play a greater part in Asia's
increasingly competitive civilian high-tech production.
Secure, stable polities and stable economies in Asia are
linked. These two factors are crucial in enhancing a state's
standing and competitiveness. Many attribute Asian economic
success to strong states whose policies provide a stable
framework for growth and believe this is the most advantageous
way for states to develop.10 China, too, offers Russia the
ideological attraction of a reformed economy combined with a
seemingly strong state and an anti-Western security policy.11 This
combination particularly appeals to nationalists and supporters
of the strong state in Russian policy since this model would seem
to show the possibilities for success of their policy at home.
To become a major regional economic power, Russia must first
develop a coherent state and policy process--establishing a
legitimate, law-abiding, hopefully democratic, and, most of all,
stable state with relatively predictable policies.12 Otherwise,
Russia's relative economic backwardness will increase, and its
fading military power will decline further, making it an
unattractive partner for Asian states. Russia's failure to subdue
Chechnya and its general military deterioration shows the fate of
military establishments that lose their economic-political
foundations.
Geopolitics offers another compelling reason for Russia to
reorganize itself for serious competition in Asia. The future
directions of China's and North Korea's policies are so
unpredictable that states who cannot keep pace with their
economic-political transformation, and the strategic consequences
thereof, risk exclusion from Asia's security agenda. They also
risk becoming the object of other states' policies in Northeast
Asia. In that case Russia, for example, would be obliged to
accept decisions affecting its vital interests with little or no
participation in the process of making those decisions. The U.S.ROK initiative drives this point home.

Failure to keep up with the economic and strategic
transformations of both Korean states, Japan, and China could
lead to a major disaster for Russia. This danger first emerged in
1994 when the United States negotiated unilaterally with North
Korea about nuclear proliferation. U.S. treaty partners supported
its position only with great difficulty. In effect, every
interested party sought to promote its own policy. But Russia
failed spectacularly to get anything out of this process, thereby
displaying its weakness and isolation. Russia acted alone to the
extent that Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev denied that Pyongyang
had a usable atomic device, a stance that logically meant there
was no crisis to worry about.13
This episode revealed many things about current trends in
Asia, including the erosion of the cold war system, the weakening
of the U.S.-built bilateral treaty and security structure, and
the lack of a new system for the region. It also underscored the
nature of the emerging Asian security system. Not only is North
Korea unstable, the old Asian security system that checked it is
buckling and cannot really check anyone else. As the Taiwan-China
crisis of March-April 1996 also made clear, only the United
States was ready, willing, or able to stand up to China's threats
to Taiwan. Yet discussions over a new Asian security system
remain tentative and exploratory. Inasmuch as Washington
admittedly finds it difficult to define how it could play a
leading role in Asia and devise meaningful concepts for
multilateral security mechanisms, the risks for Russia are still
greater.14 For Russia, which lacks a coherent state or strategy
for Asia, and is plagued by its own deep weaknesses, the risks of
being economically isolated and aloof from any functioning Asian
security system in a disorganized Asian state system are immense.
In this regard, Russia's marginality to the Korean peace process
risks more exclusion--or worse.
Russia's failure in Asia derives from its failures in
institutional stabilization and economic development. Until these
situations change, Russia's role will continue to diminish. For
this reason, before sorting out its overall East Asian strategy
and specific bilateral policies, Russia must stabilize its policy
process to produce a true strategy and coherent policies.
Accordingly, the following analysis focuses on the institutional
dimension of Russian policy and the implications of Russia's
militarization of thinking and policy for Russian security in
East Asia.
Unfortunately, few U.S. observers understand how Russia's
underdeveloped state structure fosters a cycle of growing RussoU.S. tensions and furthers Russian marginalization in Asia. For
example, Russia's weakness consistently has led U.S. policymakers
to exclude or minimize Russia's role in Asia generally, and
specifically from the Korean denuclearization and peace
processes. These actions mean disregarding major Russian security
interests. As Washington implements its policy, it creates
friction with Moscow. Meanwhile, diplomats and journalists in

Moscow reported that,
Washington has failed to understand that it cannot push
Russia on such a broad front all at once--Iran, NATO,
I.M.F. compliance and START II [it is noteworthy that
this author omits Korea, itself a sign of Russia's
marginality to Asia in American eyes-SB]--because
bureaucratically the Kremlin does not have the
qualified people to manage so many issues, so the
system is easily gridlocked, and because politically
the system cannot swallow so much at once.15
State incapacity or underdevelopment directly marginalizes
Russia, showing the risks of failing to develop an effective
state. These risks are also to be found in Russia's attempts to
escape from this condition. For instance, U.S. attempts to
marginalize Russia led Moscow to embrace an openly anti-American
rapprochement with China, to support Chinese claims in Southeast
Asia, and to proclaim a new national security doctrine where
close ties to China precede partnership with the United States.16
Even more recently, officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
proclaimed that they had virtually identical views with China on
all aspects of Asian security issues. Indeed, Russian
presidential advisor Andranik Migranyan told a Washington
conference that it was better for Russia to be Beijing's rather
than Washington's junior brother.17 This posture would negate any
hope of Russia's continuing partnership with Washington on Asian
security issues or its ability to pursue its own national
interests without Chinese encumbrances. Russia remains isolated
or dependent on either China or the United States, hence its
strategic position in Asia continues to be a tenuous one that is
exacerbated by the intimate connection that exists between
Russia's domestic crises and its strategy/ies in Asia.
Explaining Russian Security Policy in Asia.
Russia's low capacity to formulate and implement policy
appears in numerous procedural and substantive foreign and
defense policy conflicts that hold security policy hostage to
domestic politics.18 Foreign and defense policy remain a realm of
many conflicts: No standard procedure or institutional basis
exists for formulating security policy or resolving those
conflicts. There is no inter-agency process or regular mechanism
for the making, formulation, and execution of policy. Rival
ministries, the Security Council, the new Defense Council, the
legislature, the President's and the Premier's personal
administrations, interest groups both in and out of government,
all can express their views and have them heeded without regard
for order and context.19 Thus,
The activities of economic interest groups have perhaps
been less well publicized, yet, to name just a few
examples, it seems certain that Russia's atomic energy

complex has exerted significant influence over Moscow's
increasingly assertive policies vis-a-vis relations
with Iran and North Korea; that Russian oil interests
have undermined the Foreign Ministry's efforts to
thwart a Western oil consortium from exploiting energy
resources in the Caspian Sea and potentially limiting
Russia's influence in the region; and that the
uncontrolled activities of Russian arms merchants have
complicated the tasks of Russian diplomacy in a number
of foreign capitals.20
Likewise, much of the policy of arms sales to Asian states
has not only eluded state control, but has become increasingly
"privatized"; i.e., private and/or sectoral interests act
independently of state supervision with little regard for the
strategic ramifications of their sales.21 For example, it was just
revealed that Mikhail Simonov, General Director of the Sukhoi
Design Bureau, negotiated the deal giving China a production
license for indigenous manufacture of the SU-27 fighter. This was
done without official authorization, thereby committing Russia to
a substantial upgrading of China's strategic capability with no
compensation.22 Or as Kevin O'Prey writes about arms sales policy,
People who decry the gridlock in [the] U.S. government
would be in a shock if they were to look at the
situation in Russia. In Moscow there is no gridlock.
Rather, on bad days there can be five new laws or
decrees issued, some of which are contradictory and few
of which are obeyed. . . . Beyond the pulling and
hauling of competitive bureaucracies, the Russian
policymaking process appears to have no rules. Decrees
are occasionally issued by aides to the president in
his name but without his knowledge. The government at
times issues decrees despite the opposition of the
president. The new legislative branch--the Duma and the
Federation Council--in the meantime is still getting
accustomed to its proper role. Further complicating
matters, many of the initiatives churned out by Moscow
are totally ignored by regional governments and the
enterprises. As a result, the government can stumble
into armed conflicts like that with the separatist
Chechen region without consulting with the legislative
branch or, for that matter, many of the relevant
ministries.23
In fact, Yeltsin has deliberately fostered this situation to
his political advantage. Since all chains of policy and command
are vertical ones ending in Yeltsin's office or person, the
absence of horizontal integrating structures makes all politics a
contest among rival factions for access to him.24 Yeltsin, like
his predecessors, realizes his power grows if all other
institutions remain divided and underdeveloped. Presidential
power grows substantially but at the price of a lack of
coordination, domestic chaos, and reduced status abroad.

Yeltsin's techniques for stabilizing his power actually aggravate
Russia's crisis rather than resolve it.25
A March 1995 decree placed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA) directly under Yeltsin to coordinate and monitor the
activities of other agencies of the executive branch and to
ensure they pursue a unified policy. But such decrees come and
go. Indeed, one reason Yeltsin appointed Primakov to replace
Andrei Kozyrev as Foreign Minister was his desire to implement
this decree and therefore in March 1996 he signed a new decree on
the Foreign Ministry's coordinating role in the foreign policy
process.26 Meanwhile, in December 1995 a new coordinating council
was set up, not to monitor the actual policy, but rather to
monitor its implementation. This has been a time-honored Russian
and Soviet tactic that only paralyzes policymaking still
further.27 But since Primakov has been able to defend his turf,
the council now plays no role and represents another misguided
bureaucratic device that went awry.
The reorganization of the Security Council and a new Defense
Council will also exacerbate the structural tensions among
policymaking institutions regardless of the personalities
involved. Here, Yeltsin appointed retired General Aleksandr'
Lebed to head the Security Council, granted him extensive powers
to pursue security and actions against crime and corruption, and
appointed Lebed's choice, General Igor Rodionov, as successor to
Grachev. Yeltsin then published a draft law setting up a second
"Military Council" which would make decisions that are "binding
on all ministries and agencies under whose jurisdiction there may
be armed forces, other military units, and military agencies."28
And the Defense Council's powers were already changed by Yeltsin
to take Lebed down a couple of steps in October 1996. Similarly,
it should be noted that only in June 1996 did the new Law on
Defense, which this draft contradicts, go into effect. In this
context chaos reinforces bureaucratic despotism, political
confusion, and authoritarian rule unaccountable to any law or
institution.
Still, these decrees will ultimately only be as effective as
all these men can make them, a fact that displays the preeminence
of personality rather than legality in Russian politics. The 1995
decree might only have led the MFA to be more assertive in the
bureaucratic jungle. Had Kozyrev been too successful, Yeltsin
would likely have undermined his authority. But since Kozyrev
failed to improve the situation, the new agency was set up and he
was fired. However, it is not clear whether policymaking will
improve, change, or become more coherent.
Hence, absent a true rule of law, no ground rules for
bureaucratic and inter-branch interaction exist. For instance, in
the Chechen terrorist fiasco of January 1996, the Ministry of
Interior spokesman contradicted the spokesman for the Federal
Security Service publicly stating, "We don't talk to each other-We don't plan together."29 And as Chechnya repeatedly shows,

commanders on the ground have repeatedly refused to implement
Yeltsin's orders or policies without suffering any consequences
of this insubordination. Likewise the Ministry of Atomic Energy
and Ministry of Defense (MOD) each act as a state within a
state.30 Thus the system of defense policymaking is uncontrolled
and uncoordinated. Yeltsin's periodic decrees to end confusion in
policymaking have had the opposite effect. New decrees will
change nothing.31 Until and unless a state order is established,
Russia's marginalization in Asia and elsewhere will accelerate.
If Russian power and influence are to recover, Russia must
reverse this "deinstitutionalization."32
Debates over foreign and defense policy are not necessarily
or exclusively over institutional turf and budget interests, or
personal rivalries. Persistent, pervasive, and fundamental
ideological cleavages over national identity and interest create
a second enduring problem.33 These cleavages manifest themselves
in the substantive executive branch discord that exists with
Parliament over fundamental policies. Without the rule of law,
there is a free-for-all. Parliamentarians feel free to denounce
their government's policies in ways that weaken international
confidence in Russian policy or its makers; e.g., by voting to
nullify the dissolution of the Soviet Union, as in March 1996.34
Third, intense discord over general and specific policies
across the entire political establishment exacerbates domestic
political discord. For example, while Russia swaps arms for debt
to South Korea, other elites in and out of government openly urge
new arms sales to North Korea.35 By all accounts, intense battles
over Korea policy, did--and still--occur.36 These debates evoke an
uncertain, even confused policy abroad. Certainly such visible
divisions over policy have not helped Russia obtain its aims with
either Korean state.
A fourth cause of failure to make a coherent policy is that
Yeltsin thwarts stable policymaking by acting either against his
ministries or without their knowledge. For instance, the Ministry
of Defense was not consulted before the invasion of Chechnya.
Clearly, Yeltsin, like his predecessors, feels untrammelled by-or unaccountable to--anyone or any institution.37
Therefore Russian policy emerges from intense struggles
among institutions and personalities. These struggles occur
despite a working strategic consensus on two points: first, that
Russia must have a free hand across the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) to reestablish its hegemony over the
territory of the former USSR and reunite it. The second point is
that friendship with China is essential to Russian interests.
The absence of the rule of law and the inadequate
constraints on political participation also allow military
leaders to agitate publicly for their goals. This fact
legitimizes the military's politicization and its earlier efforts
to usurp control of foreign policy.38 And this factor also erodes

all hope of effective, civilian, democratic control over the
armed forces. Kozyrev consistently claimed that the MOD and
intelligence agencies sought to usurp foreign policy. Indeed, he
told U.S. audiences that failure to support his arguments on
major issues meant he would be speaking to us "from the Gulag."39
This apocalyptic and hysterical rhetoric underscores Russia's
weakness and uncertain policies.
Grachev's 1993 remarks about relations with South Korea
confirm Kozyrev's claims. In no democracy would Grachev have
said,
I am willing to exchange opinion and cooperate with all
Asian countries and their military leaders on all
issues falling under the jurisdiction of our business.
. . . even in those instances in which politicians and
diplomats were at a loss to solve problems between two
countries, soldiers were capable of finding common
ground within the framework of military cooperation
between the two.40
Grachev never altered his views. Instead he admitted that he has
refused to implement presidential decrees in Chechnya for at
least a week because he thought they were strategically illconceived.41
These trends in civil-military relations mirror broader
trends in the body politic as the war in Chechnya and the
repeated convulsions atop the Russian power institutions
continue to show us. Yeltsin told the Duma in February 1995 that,
The institutions of state power have yet to accumulate
sufficient weight to ensure that force does not have to
be applied to restore Russian sovereignty on their
territory. Today, the state has to resort to the
exercise of is right to use strong-arm methods in order
to preserve the country's integrity.42 (emphasis in
original)
Unfortunately, 18 months later, this is still the case. These
remarks concede Yeltsin's failure to build coherent and
legitimate governing institutions and preserve Moscow's undivided
authority in security policy.
Center-Periphery Relations.
Moscow's relationship with local or regional governing
institutions in Russian Asia is no different or better. And as
these provinces are crucial gateways to the rest of Asia, the
failure to build stable relationships with them is an ominous
one. Evgeny Nazdratenko, Governor of Russia's Maritime Province
(Primorskii Krai), is unilaterally attempting to undo Russia's
border treaty with China by sealing the border and restricting

immigration. These acts threaten the 1996 five-power treaty with
China, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, delimiting the
Sino-Russian border, returning some 300 hectares of land seized a
century ago to China, and instituting confidence and security
building measures (CSBMs) along the border; a major achievement
of Yeltsin's government.43
Maritime Territory authorities vow that they will never
surrender the land because (1) it has been Russian from
time immemorial, and (2) it is a strategic staging area
for Russia that, if turned over to China, would give
that country access to the sea.44
Therefore, a key member of the commission to demarcate the
boundary, General Viktor Rozov, resigned because he could not
supervise policies harmful to the state. Then the Ussuri Cossacks
decided to defend the land on their own and now guard the
disputed lands with mounted patrols which Nazdratenko supports,
another case of rupturing civilian democratic control of the
armed forces.45 Nazdratenko's continuing tenure in office despite
his insubordination, politicization of the local military and
paramilitary forces and challenge to Moscow's priorities
illustrates the weaknesses in Russia's Asia policy.
Russia also still lacks coherent institutional arrangements
for implementing a national economic or security policy. Yeltsin
and his subordinates have no effective party or political
organizations with which to discipline independently minded
governors and local politicians. The unwieldy system that
combines elected representatives with centrally appointed
governors, like Nazdratenko, has failed because governors like
him have become advocates for continued central subsidies even as
they obstruct structural reforms that harm their interests.46
Consequently, Nazdratenko's policies hobble Russia's interaction
with Asian economies and Primorskii Krai remains one of Russia's
most depressed regions. Naturally this depression adds to the
region's estrangement from Moscow as shown in the Parliamentary
elections of December 1995, when this region went heavily for
Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic party and the Communist
Party. This estrangement from Moscow also appears in the publicly
voiced sentiments of the local businessmen who profess to have
turned their backs on the domestic market even though the region
cannot survive without Moscow providing basic goods and services
like electricity.
Primorskii Krai's complaints and assertiveness against the
center are hardly isolated phenomena. Rather, they epitomize a
general tendency in center-periphery relations with important
consequences for Russia's Asia policy. Regional governments
display a persisting assertiveness to further decentralize their
relations with Moscow, e.g., by moving from federal to confederal
relations, or from nominal to real federalism. This demand unites
republics, districts, and regions, and reflects local elites'
ambition to control their own resources free from Muscovite

control.47 Some Western observers worry that Russia might
disintegrate or that central controls will loosen beyond Moscow's
ability to conduct a national economic policy. The Siberian and
Far Eastern provinces are particularly vulnerable to those
possibilities or threats.48 In early 1996 Yeltsin had to sign an
agreement with Khabarovsk Krai's Governor, Viktor Ishayev, giving
the region more powers and assistance, and announcing a new
program to revitalize the Russian Far East as part of his
reelection campaign.49 Even more central provinces like
Bashkortostan also demand greater autonomy.50 All these assaults
on an enfeebled central government by regions experiencing
emigration, insufficient population to support the region, a
distorted trade structure, and who cannot control trade and labor
policies underscore Moscow's lack of a "coherent policy to deal
with the end of the central government's dominance of the Far
East."51
If central power does recede, despite Moscow's best efforts,
that would have enormous security implications for Russia and
Asia. A recession of Russian power would stimulate greater
international competition for influence along Russian and CIS
Asian frontiers. Such an outcome would then validate the most
alarmist of current Russian threat scenarios that every other
major and neighboring power is interested in breaking Russia up.
As Sherman Garnett suggests, Moscow ought to open the region to
planned multilateral foreign investment to create a balance
between competing interests and ward off such a danger.52 But,
absent a coherent policy such competition will not develop and
the region will either stagnate or come under unilateral foreign
influence. Some analysts, like Alexander Nemets, suggest that
this has already begun and that China is establishing regional
hegemony.53
The Chechnya tragedy, Moscow's greatest regional challenge,
suggests that Russia has nothing to offer its Asiatic provinces
or Asia in general except armed force of questionable quality.
Whereas Tsarism and Soviet power had superior state
organizations, attractive ideologies, and a deeply rooted sense
of Russia's civilizing mission, today those elements are gone.
Instead, Russia itself must learn from Asia, a most difficult
requirement. Thus, as Allen Lynch observes, "a centuries-old
process whereby Moscow extended and maintained its rule
throughout Europe and Asia is now being reversed. The only
question is where the new line of Moscow's effective jurisdiction
will be drawn."54 Moscow predictably reacts by regarding any
concession to decentralization as a mere prelude to further
rising demands against its power. Therefore, it resists these
demands.55 But Moscow cannot make this resistance stick or improve
local conditions to overcome the sources of unrest.
Hence Nazdratenko's insubordination reflects a broader
struggle between Moscow and the provinces for power. Moscow's
resistance to devolution will probably trigger strong clashes
over center-periphery issues including Asian policy. Kozyrev

stated that neither he nor Yeltsin had gone to China, Japan, or
Korea without consulting with the appropriate regions on all
questions. Yeltsin's trip to Khabarovsk on his way to China in
April 1996 confirmed that. Just before his dismissal, Kozyrev
belatedly awoke to the danger inherent in the Far East and
Siberia not being integrated with Moscow and declared that Moscow
should show them its solicitude. Naturally, he attributed his
concern to the regime's poor showing in the Far East during the
1995 elections. But, at the same time, he noted that the Far
Eastern provinces should begin to seek their role in Asia and
Russia could assist them in doing so.56 Kozyrev's statements
indicate that Russia's Asian policy remains hostage to domestic,
institutional, and center-periphery struggles, even as Moscow's
centralizing policies are widely held responsible for these
provinces' anger at Moscow as well as their continued
impoverishment. Moscow and the provinces are locked in a fatal
embrace, where each side prevents the other from making progress.
The ensuing absence of policy opens the way to autonomous
regional politics. Former Governor Valentin P. Fedorov of
Sakhalin, in blocking concessions to Japan since 1992, showed how
enterprising regional governors can successfully join with the
military to constrain Moscow's policies.
While some U.S. observers make strident, if not overstated
claims that the Russian state is "weak and irrelevant," decaying,
and either dying or disintegrating; in fact, center-periphery
problems are serious, persistent, and widespread.57 The evidence
of these struggles suggests that Moscow and the regions are each
too fragmented internally to act unilaterally or coherently.
Certainly there seems to be a constant struggle in the Maritime
Province. And this struggle is being duplicated in several other
provinces. Yakutia (or Sakha) demands direct access to China and
Japan so that it can sell its gold and diamonds there and avoid
exorbitant Moscow-based transportation costs and taxes. In late
1995 Ishayev joined what he stated was a growing mass movement in
Khabarovsk Krai to support the idea of a Far Eastern Republic.
Ishayev expressed enormous frustration at Yeltsin's and Prime
Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's unwillingness to reverse the
enormous transportation tariffs or ensure that their instructions
are carried out.58 He concluded that,
We must have rights which will ensure that we can
develop our own economy and use our natural resources
for the good of the region and its inhabitants and the
whole of Russia. For this we need our own network of
banks, not, like, now, dozens of branches of Moscow
banks which merely gobble up our money, our own customs
service, and our own tax police and inspectorate. And
as you can see these are the attributes of a republic.
Incidentally, the antagonism of the territories is, in
many respects, generated by the lack of openness and
glasnost' in their mutual relations with the center, in
the division into favorites and the unloved. . . . We
are trying to achieve one thing: if the center does not

help us to develop the economy and solve social
problems, let it not get in our way.59
Yeltsin's new program for the Russian Far East and Siberia are
clearly efforts to stop this movement. But previous programs that
went nowhere are all too numerous and by July 1996 the Far East
again faced a major economic crisis to which Moscow has responded
lamely.
The ubiquity of regionalist sentiments shows that Moscow
will confront enormous pressures until and unless it creates a
viable government and political process. Cross-cutting cleavages
among political actors, lobbies, and factions will impede
resolution of many issues and could trigger demands for harsh
recentralization, regional secession, a stable devolution of
power, or other unforeseeable consequences.
These intense central-local struggles and fragmented policy
processes have immense implications for Russia's domestic,
foreign, and defense politics. Socio-economic reconstruction in
Russian Asia is the foundation of any coherent policy towards
Asia as a whole. But a state so gridlocked that it cannot devise
the necessary institutions or policies will foster fragmentation
and/or opportunities for inter-bloc coalitions that further
impede reforms and democratization.60 It is precisely Russia's
incomplete and unfulfilled democratization that has generated
these possibilities for civic, and/or civilian-military,
factionalism and political gridlock. This gridlock and factional
strife have held reform hostage by legitimizing the use of
nationalism, e.g., in the Kurile Islands, to obstruct reforms and
an approach to Asia.
Furthermore, protracted internal instability over federallocal issues of sovereignty, power, and control of resources
frightens off prospective Asian and Western investors whose
capital is essential for any reconstruction. A Russian delegate
to ASEAN's 1993 ministerial conference observed that,
By stating their desire to be separate from Moscow,
certain political forces in Siberia and the Far East
are merely scaring off potential investors. No one is
going to invest money in a country where there is no
central authority to control the situation in the
regions and protect foreign capital investments. As
soon as there began to be talk of creating a Far East
Republic, the ASEAN countries froze several joint
projects which were of great advantage to us, including
one on the construction of plants in Amur Oblast.61
In 1995, Vladivostok's provincial and municipal government's
exorbitant demands for taxes, payoffs, and kickbacks, and its
criminality led Hyundai to pull out of major investments there.62
This episode dramatized the link between Russia's unresolved
domestic crisis and its inability to obtain the international

resources needed to move forward in Asia. Since greater
integration with Asian economies is universally regarded as a
fundamental precondition for Russia's advance in Asia, such
misadventures and the larger domestic policy failures preclude
that advance. Regardless of Russia's specific foreign and defense
policies, failure to establish a legitimate or stable economicpolitical order will impede regional development in Russia's Far
East as well as the formulation of a coherent Russian Asian
policy. As long as Russia cannot create a viable civic order at
home, few will seek its counsel, and it will continue to be
marginalized in Asia. Unfortunately, a state like Russia, when
denied the normal kinds of relationships with its neighbors and
partners abroad, will find "abnormal" ways to relate to them. And
these "abnormal" relationships that hold back regional stability
and progress will be much harder for the United States to deal
with in the future.
Domestic Politics and Arms Sales.
The fiasco of the SU-27 licensing deal with China, cited
above, shows how the breakdown of the policy process adds to the
dangers to Russian security in Asia. Russian arms sales to Asian
states exemplify the "abnormal" relationships that have emerged
in the absence of sufficiently "legitimate" or normal
international relations within the state and between Russia and
Asian governments. The absence of viable central institutions to
direct security and economic policies; endemic factionalism;
poorly restrained self-seeking interest articulation and
aggregation; inter-branch animosity; ideological cleavages; and
the absence of a coherent strategy for Asia, all manifest
themselves in Russian arms sales to Asia, especially to China,
Russia's single largest customer.63
For example, in the absence of a coherent policy that
provides for the regional development of the Russian Far East and
the demilitarization of the post-Soviet economy, arms factories
in this region have withstood pressures for reform only by
producing weapons for export to China. Thus they become a lobby
for continued sales as well as an impediment to future reform.64
Their stance gives China leverage in both Vladivostok and Moscow
despite regional authorities' anger at the unceasing flow of
Chinese immigrants and traders into the area.65 But in the absence
of coherent central policies for Russia's regions and for
civilianizing the economy, there are few other likely options.
China's motives for seeking arms are clear. China not only
wants to obtain weapons platforms, like other Asian states, it
also wants production techniques and state-of-the-art
technology.66 Many Russian officers are reluctant to provide
offsets that would strengthen their most likely Asiatic military
rival. Yet the absence of coherent state authority and policy led
Sukhoi to think only in terms of its sales and not of Russia's
national interests. Moscow then had to accept Sukhoi's deal lest

China become angry.67 Sukhoi's actions underline the defense
industry's constant pressure to sell without restrictions, as
well as the fact that arms sales policy offers many uniquely
corrupting opportunities to this industry which exercises
considerable influence on arms sales policy. In fact, it is a
graphic example of the overall privatization of security policy-the pursuit of private interests at the expense of national
goals--due to the failures at the center. Arms transfer policy is
a particularly deep-rooted manifestation of this process.
In 1992, then Vice-Premier Aleksandr' Shokhin admitted that
many design bureaus and enterprises were seeking private deals
with China.68 By 1993 Russia had no idea how many scientists were
working in or for China and could not control the arms sales
process. Andrei Kuzmenko said then, "The producers are now more
or less independent. And they have their own independent lobby."69
Other reports confirmed Kuzmenko's remarks and blasted sales like
the transfer of an enriched uranium plant to China because they
were largely paid for by consumer goods instead of cash.70 The
opportunities for mindless pursuit of private gain are even
greater today because, since 1995, Yeltsin increasingly has
allowed arms producers to sell directly to buyers.71 During his
1996 reelection campaign, he yielded further to the defense
industry and gave it a ministry so that it could export more
freely and receive more state subsidies. As is well known,
without these subsidies, the defense industry would collapse.72
Even if Yeltsin subsequently reverses himself, it is unlikely
that the government can control the flow of arms or secret deals
due to the pervasive official corruption.
Unregulated and unrestricted arms sales are potential
dangers to Russia's overall Asia policy. Obviously, giving China
high-performance jets, Kilo-class submarines with their inherent
quieting technology, and uranium enrichment facilities improves
Beijing's capacity to conduct conventional power projection and
ASW operations as well as to produce nuclear weapons. Due to the
progressive eradication of effective controls over arms sales,
Russia has become the main source of foreign support for China's
military modernization even though Russia's government and
military know very well the risks involved.
But this understanding cannot help change the
situation, since the arms sales in post-communist
Russia have been turned into a certain kind of MIC
[military-industrial complex] foreign policy that is
actually beyond the control of the Parliament, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and even the Ministry of
Defense. In reality, any military plant can easily
avoids bans or restrictions imposed by the government
in selling weaponry to another country, if not directly
then through intermediary commercial companies, which
tend to disappear the day after the deal is done.
(Also, the seller can easily bribe customs officials,
who will register a MiG fighter, for example, as scrap

metal.)73
Recent Russian analyses of arms sales to China are even more
scathing in attacking the strategic mindlessness of these sales
and the lack of any strategic foresight among those making the
policy.74
These trends in arms sales suggest that in many ways Russia
(or key economic, military, scientific, and political elites)
could be corrupted by or become hostage to Chinese policies and
developments. That outcome would severely limit, if not
undermine, reform. Thus Russian arms sales to China bridge
domestic policy and security concerns and could, in and of
themselves, raise considerable risks and costs to Russia. Since
China is Russia's most prominent partner in Asia, the volume of
arms sales to China makes those sales critical policy
instruments. The systems being sold and the linkages thereby
established may exert major influence on Russia's future domestic
and foreign policies. The profitable arms trade with China and
Asia stimulates and justifies the demands of the defense industry
to control arms sales along with its new freedom to sell weapons
abroad. The importance of arms sales also attracts both the MOD
and MFA as well as the defense industry, each wanting to control
the process and policy. Thus, a full-scale turf battle occurs
among agencies that want to control and benefit from the overall
arms sales program.75 The military-industrial complex and
Yeltsin's recent decree confirms that this element in Russian
society and politics seems to be winning this battle. But the
upshot of that victory is continuing absence of any sense of
national interest on the part of defense enterprises' management.
The defense industry's primary objectives are direct control
over foreign currency and operating freedom. Defense
industrialists also want a privileged relationship with the
government and continued preferential treatment through
subsidies. Defense industrialists and their allies view arms
sales as a way to avoid civilian conversion and to continue
defense production for export under state protection.76 The
establishment of such a long-term relationship between the state
and the defense industry would perpetuate the defense industry's
privileged position in the state, a major contributory cause of
the ruination of Soviet military power. Continued large sales to
China and other Asian governments are a most crucial element in
this process.
Viktor Glukikh, former Chairman of the State Committee on
Defense Industry, admitted that only arms sales could fund
investment in the defense industry since weapons procurement has
been radically slashed since 1991.77 Similarly, this lobby's
leaders continually broadcast their plight to demand more and
more state support lest the industry go bankrupt. These pleas
have elicited pledges of future support from key officials.
Furthermore, Yeltsin has increased defense spending, liberalized
the rules for arms sales, and created a ministry of defense

industry.78 But even that fails to satisfy many defense
industrialists who unanimously supported the League to Support
Defense Industry Enterprises' April 1995 call to form their own
political party and strip the MOD of some powers that should go
to Glukikh's Committee.79
At the same time, Grachev often reiterated that the MOD
should control and run the arms sales program.80 Although some
elements of the MOD opposed selling individual models of hightech, state-of-the-art-weapons, the MOD overall was dangerously
willing to sell such models through the companies it controls.81
Grachev and the MOD evidently tried to establish autonomous
sources of funding exclusively under his control for this
purpose.82 For instance, in 1995, military space authorities sold
three of Russia's most advanced upper-stage rocket engines to
China in violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime, and
did not go through NPO Energiamash, the only legal entity
licensed to sell this engine.83 The identity of the person or
persons who authorized the sale and pocketed the proceeds remains
a mystery. This episode and the Sukhoi-27 deal both point to
eroding state control.
The dangerous implication of the rivalry over arms sales is
that Russia has no enforceable export control law. Presidential
decrees governing export policies are subject to change at any
time. Nor can the government currently enforce any coherent
policy. The government is notoriously corrupt, while the defense
industry is increasingly part of large financial-industrial
cartels that depend on bank capital that the state controls. Or
else, defense industries depend on state orders for weapons or
licenses for exporting arms. These relationships offer many
possibilities for "privatization," and corruption of arms sales
by selfish interests and officials is very great. State control,
where state officials have a pecuniary interest in permitting
sales for a price and can satisfy that interest with impunity, is
also a contradiction in terms.
These factors illustrate the many domestic risks present in
the extensive arms trade with China, and other Asian states who
may yet become embroiled with China. India has already raised
questions about the sale of advanced fighter aircraft to China.84
China reportedly acts clandestinely and directly with Russian
producers and sellers of military systems and technologies rather
than through Moscow.85 That impedes civilian control over the
military and defense industry and conceivably could also further
corrupt Russian politics as a whole by increasing China's covert
influence on policy. Even where Moscow knows about the deals
being made, it is unclear if it controls the policy or the
process.
Russian Arms Sales and Asian Security.
Russia's uncontrolled arms sales program to China also has

serious implications for international security in Asia. Russian
arms sales to China could encourage Beijing's coercive diplomacy,
or even military actions. Chinese gambits along such lines would
degrade Asian security, and spur a brisk regional arms race.
Certainly everyone is already buying advanced arms, and defense
spending in key states like China and Taiwan is growing.
Furthermore, China clearly has an expansionist naval and military
strategy and repeatedly threatens the vital interests of its
neighbors.86 For instance, in 1996 it used missiles in
international waters in peacetime against Taiwan. Regardless of
whether one believes China has a strong case regarding Taiwan,
this certainly is an unprecedented use of force in peacetime.
Russia's efforts to sell arms to other Asian states also
appear to be poorly thought out regarding their implications for
Russia or for Asian security. Russia's existing arms sales also
foster growing mutual suspicion among Asian states and could
hinder Russia's relations with them. In 1993 Japan's Miyazawa
government increasingly tied arms sales to China to the return of
the Kurile Islands as a precondition for aid to Russia, because
it rightly saw these arms sales as anti-Japanese.87 While Russia
also offers arms across Southeast Asia and to South Korea, it
appears to be unconcerned that these states are among the most
suspicious of China's aims and could easily become involved in a
local war against China or North Korea, alternatives that would
force Russia to make uncomfortable policy choices.
Continued arms sales to both Korean states could easily
contribute to the risks to Russia's own security if inter-Korean
relations keep on deteriorating. Advocates of Russian arms sales
to North and/or South Korea, which include the General Staff,
fail to grasp the dangerous implications of arms sales to either
Korean state.88 Thus from 1992-94, the growing signs of Russian
arms sales and technology transfers, including talk of nuclear
technology transfer to South Korea, certainly increased North
Korea's already great interest in playing the nuclear card.89 More
recently, the advocacy of arms sales to North Korea remains
strong. Those favoring such arms sales to Pyongyang do so even
though Russia now seeks a new treaty with Pyongyang that would
eliminate the automatic response to aggression clause contained
in the 1961 Soviet-North Korean treaty. Allegedly selling arms to
the North (which cannot pay for them) will somehow restore
Moscow's "leverage" over Pyongyang and make Russia a player once
again in Asia. Russia has apparently tried to convince South
Korea's government that the agreement of June 1994 to suspend
military sales to North Korea is conditional upon South Korea
buying Russian arms for Russian debt.90 This is an attempt at
blackmail which has already helped to jaundice Seoul's view of
Moscow. Here, too, the risks of so unrewarding a policy seem to
have been overlooked in the military-industrial complex's and
hard-liners' rush to satisfy dubious institutional, material and
ideological aims that relate primarily to Russian domestic
politics.

These examples demonstrate that defense firms and their
governmental allies, who have captured state policy, rationalize
arms sales to Asia as a major instrument of a new Russian
standing and presence. Kozyrev accepted their view when he told
ASEAN's 1993 Annual Ministerial Meeting and Post-Ministerial
Conference that Russia views arms sales as a way to enter Asia's
security agenda and restructure its security order, e.g., by
establishing an arms trade code.91 In 1995, he proposed a code of
conduct for Asian security that also included arms sales.92 Since
Russia's current economic and political crises preclude any
imminent revival of its economic standing and partnership with
Asia, arms sales will long play a disproportionate role in
policy.
Accordingly, the economic-political failure to transform the
defense industry into a productive and going concern and the
structure of Asian interstate relations drive Russia to make arms
sales the centerpiece of its Asian policy. Yet, the policy of
arms sales as the central ingredient of Russian relations with
Asia perpetuates political and economic irrationalities that
undermine reform. Such policy decisions undermine, rather than
enhance, Russia's influence in South Korea, North Korea, and
Southeast Asia. In the case of Southeast Asia, Russia is
regarded, apart from arms sales, as a marginal player, invited by
courtesy to ASEAN's Asian Regional Forum.93 Furthermore, Russia
has made clear its intention to support Beijing's views on
Southeast Asia, namely that ASEAN must adopt a one-China policy
and conform to China's preferences on the troubling issue of the
Spratly Islands. China's policy paper advocating this position,
that Russia gratuitously signed onto, irritated ASEAN and can
impair Moscow's standing there.94
China's own growing role as arms exporter also heightens
this subject's importance. Joint venture or co-production accords
could lead China to produce Russian systems or foster joint
production with Russia for re-export abroad at dumping prices
that undercut Russian producers. Since Chinese arms sales firms
are lucrative preserves of key leaders' relatives and essential
for military modernization, strong domestic pressures exist in
China to maintain or expand China's ability to produce and sell
high-quality weapons.
Most dangerous for Russia, however, is the fact that its
dependence on Chinese arms purchases robs it of diplomatic
flexibility in Asia. Moscow has renounced normalization with
Japan, and used ties with China to resist U.S. pressures and
assert its independence in world affairs. This stance does not
add to Russia's flexibility, but rather minimizes it since it
depends on China. Indeed, Migranyan said publicly that Russia
would prefer to be Beijing's little brother rather than
Washington's. Russia, then, is no longer available to balance
against China's possible hegemony in Asia and stands closer to
Beijing than to Washington, just as China stands closer to it
than to Washington. This situation leads both states to try to

restrict U.S. influence in Asia.95 But while Moscow seeks
Beijing's support for its entry into APEC and Asia as a whole,
China has used the tie to Moscow to draw closer to Washington,
indicating that Miasnikov's warnings about China's probable
betrayal of Russian interests may have merit.96 Thus, in a real
sense, Russia cannot now opt out of the arms sales business to
China because that policy is its sole source of leverage upon
Beijing. If Russia wants to gain such entry into Asia, especially
since Russian policy is increasingly anti-American and ties with
Japan are still frigid, it now must follow China's lead. Yet by
tying itself to Beijing and throwing good money and resources
after bad, Moscow incurs substantial and growing economicpolitical opportunity costs as well as possible future military
dangers. As a result, Russian arms sales contribute heavily to a
policy that ultimately contradicts and endangers Russian
interests in Asia.
Ultimately the centrality of arms sales in Russian policy
towards Asia stems from the failure to break through to a new
level of economic and political reconstruction that can stabilize
the defense industry and limit its political clout. As a result
of that failure, this industry constantly tries to attach itself
to the state and also serves as a conduit through which key state
players are corrupted because arms sales are so profitable. Thus
the result from the failure to reform is the corruption of major
state actors, institutions, and the policy process as a whole.
Actually, policy is significantly "privatized," becoming a
vehicle for the enshrinement of private pecuniary lobbies over
strategic national interests. And the beneficiaries of this state
of affairs are precisely those who are inclined to stress
military instruments and an anti-Western and traditional
Realpolitik view of the world as the basis of Russian policy.
Accordingly, Russia's leading military columnist, Pavel
Felgengauer, who has excellent ties with the General Staff, wrote
that defense industry and government spokesmen believe that,
The sale of Russian-made fighters, submarines, advanced
and long-range strategic S-300 PMU-1 surface-to-air
missile systems and Smerch multiple rocket launchers,
along with the Ministry of Atomic Energy's construction
in China of a centrifuge uranium-enrichment plant using
technology developed at Tomsk-7 (the closed city of
Seversk), could become not only a way for our hapless
military-industrial complex to preserve jobs and earn
money, but also the start of a long-range strategic
partnership and a new balance of force in Asia that
would favor Russia.97
Such assertions of narrow, self-seeking, and sectoral interests
not only betray an absence of strategic perspective on what
Russia must do to be an Asian player, they also illustrate a
dangerously one-sided belief that military issues and resources
alone suffice to reverse the trend towards marginalization and

reassert Russia as a major and respected Asian player.
Ironically, while Felgengauer was writing in conjunction with the
1996 summit in Beijing, other correspondents were rightly
lamenting the fact that Russia missed the Euro-Asian economic
summit in Bangkok. As long as the elements of the mindset
portrayed by Felgengauer are not addressed and overcome, Russia's
marginalization in Asia due to economic-political weakness will
continue. And that marginalization will triumph over the utopian
dream of great power on the basis of a rapidly declining military
and defense industry.
The Militarizing View in Ascendancy.
Russian security policy in Asia and elsewhere also suffers
from the triumph of a world view that still sees Asian security
mainly in military terms. This martial outlook is not confined to
the armed forces, nor do all military men promote it, but it is
linked to the overall structural defects of Russian policy and
has distorted policymaking vis-à-vis Asia. This prevailing view
also reflects the prior institutional failure and inhibits a
rethinking of security policy and domestic reform. Felgengauer's
report highlights several key aspects of the militarizing view
which casts traditional power and geopolitical considerations as
the sole factors defining Russian security perspectives. Although
economics is regarded as the foundation of national power, it
takes a back seat to Realpolitik and to exaggerated claims for
Russia based on a Hobbesian perception of the world and of
threats to Russia. As one analysis of trends in Russian
geopolitical thinking concluded,
However, beneath the recognition of the changes that
economic and technological development, particularly in
Europe and Asia, have wrought on geopolitics, for
Russians the concept of Eurasia remains rooted, as it
has been historically, in control and defense of
territory. It should, in this sense, be seen not only
as the current means of binding the country together
against the internal and external forces that may
threaten its unity, but also the continuing basis of
Russia's great power aspirations.98
Minister of Interior, General Anatoly Kulikov, recently
wrote that virtually all of Russia's neighbors and other
interested powers actually--or potentially--threaten Russia's
integrity. Therefore, the main basis of threat assessments must
remain the geopolitical one, which emphasizes the use of force in
reply.99 Such thinking also unduly emphasizes Russia's standing as
a great power equal to the United States, even if reality belies
such pretensions. Accordingly, due to Russia's equal status to
the United States, it must receive great power preferences and
compensations equal to those of the United States. Moreover,
Moscow holds that the West owes it something. Major General
Anatoly Bolyatko (Retired) wrote that the United States must

compensate for Russia's reduced military power in Asia by
reducing and dissolving its own power in a compensating mechanism
of a regional security system. That system would be based on a
series of multilateral regional security structures and
confidence-building mechanisms to lessen the threat of war.100
Highlighting another aspect of this militarized world view,
Alexei Zagorsky observed that the armed forces were, in fact, not
committed to true military reform. In fact, he charged that they
had changed relatively little in their anti-Western outlook since
1991 and hoped to restore Russia's great power status.101
Similarly, Russian threat assessments and military
procurements in both Asia and Europe remain wedded to the threat
of a great power war with the United States and its allies. For
example, a Russian Air Force threat assessment in 1994 argued
that Japan could launch an air offensive and amphibious attack
against the Kuriles and Sakhalin with U.S. help. The objectives
would to be seal off those islands and the Russian Pacific Fleet
and to destroy Russian installations and forces in the Far
East.102 The notion that Russia would neither have warning nor
could respond to or deter this threat by its nuclear and
conventional forces is bizarre, to say the least. But Russian
planners use this scenario, and threats of NATO invasion and a
Russo-Chinese war to demand an air fleet of 2000 planes.103
Alexei Arbatov observed that this threat assessment reflects
the armed forces' natural tendency to retain the maximum number
of traditional strategic roles and operational missions, while
giving only lip service to new security realities. He notes that
Russian armed forces' military requirements are still driven by
contingency planning for major war with the United States, its
NATO allies, and/or Japan. Therefore he charged that, "Nothing
has really changed in the fundamental military approaches to
contingency planning." The military's interest in selfpreservation drives its threat assessment, force structure, and
deployment policy rather than threat analysis determining the
true needs of the armed forces.104
The absence of effective governmental control certainly
contributes to this state of affairs, and as long as this
mentality drives Russian defense policy, Russia will confront a
hostile Japan and United States. To secure global parity with the
United States, a stated goal of prominent naval commanders,
Moscow, under Gorbachev and even after, has insisted on
maintaining 22-24 SSBNs in the Sea of Okhotsk and other Asian
bastions; 40 SSNs; over 150 naval aviation aircraft; Russia's
largest surface fleet; and a large ground force in Asia. These
forces constituted a standing threat to Japan and have driven
Japan's very sizable force developments. By 1991 Japan had
reacted to the Soviet regional buildup by obtaining almost 90
percent of the number of antisubmarine warfare (ASW) aircraft as
the United States possessed throughout the Pacific and Indian
Oceans, more tactical fighter aircraft than the United States had
in Japan and Korea combined, and a potent, modern, and balanced

navy.105
New force deployments also suggest the continuing primacy of
major conventional, if not nuclear, warfighting in policy. Ever
quieter submarines, SSBNs (subsurface nuclear powered submarines
carrying nuclear missiles) and SSGNs (nuclear powered attack
submarines with conventional ordnance and missiles) with greater
attack ranges, are being produced at a steady rate and are
tracking the U.S. fleet for the first time in years.106
Current naval threat assessments are not significantly
different from the old Soviet ones. In 1995, Rear Admiral Valery
Aleksin of the Naval Academy advocated a building program through
2015 giving Russia 440 basic ocean-going warships: SSBNs, SSNs,
and destroyers with cruise missiles, frigates, missile patrol
boats, small guided-missile ships, amphibious ships, and mine
sweepers. This figure omits antisubmarine ships, aircraft
carriers, coastal missile forces and marines, and the investment
in infrastructure needed to sustain this force and defend against
all enemies, not just the United States.107 This demand comes for
a time when the U.S. Navy will have about 330 projected oceangoing ships!
Aleksin's threat assessment and force proposal also presumes
returning to Soviet practices of worst case scenarios, and
readiness for every conceivable contingency. He observed that:
Calculations show that the reliable performance of
tasks by the naval strategic forces of homing
antisubmarine rocket weapons systems in the Northern
and Pacific fleets in a state of constant readiness,
with no less than 15-20 units having a total of up to
240 ballistic missiles and about 1000 warheads. Only
this will guarantee the stability of the Nuclear
Strategic Forces of Russia under the most varied
versions of the development of conflicts of any
intensity.108
He argued that in wartime Russian forces must be able to strike
throughout the enemy's entire depth of force disposition to
terminate hostilities.109 Aleksin called for a Russian worldwide
oceanic strike force against every major naval power and
imaginable contingency. Even if Russia could afford this burden,
the program would unite all the major naval states against it.
Aleksin's first strike scenario postulates a massive land,
sea, and air-based missile strike from hundreds, if not
thousands, of miles away from Russia. In that scenario, Russia's
enemies possess new generations of Sea Launched Cruise Missiles
(SLCMs) that can fire on Russia from the entire Northern
Atlantic, the Indian, and the Pacific Oceans from as far away as
Guam and Midway.110 Therefore the Russian navy must deny those
"sanctuaries" to the enemy. Russia's SSNs with SLCMs are the best
weapon to counteract enemy delivery systems, followed by naval

aviation. Accordingly he recommends a force that will not only
fight across the world's oceans but can also achieve superiority
over "probable coalitions" in wartime and peacetime deterrence.111
Since then he has had to retract his desires and advocate a fleet
of 300 vessels by 2010-2015. But clearly, his original article
reflects his fundamental viewpoint.
Even if this is the usual call for more ships, these threat
scenarios betray how little Aleksin and the Navy have learned
from the Soviet collapse and the persistence of worst-case
scenarios, inflated threats, and fantastic military construction
assessments based on a nightmarish Realpolitik. Furthermore,
Aleksin's threat assessment implicitly reasserts the demand for a
bastion where Russian forces can act freely: in effect, a
"limited" theater of strategic military action (TVD) in the
Pacific from whence Russian ASW, naval aviation, and SSBNs can
traverse the ocean to strike preemptively at enemy platforms. The
prerequisite for this TVD remains an ability to subsume Japan and
both Koreas within a Russian air, air defense, and naval umbrella
and deny them to others. As long as such scenarios drive strategy
and policy, Japan is a perpetually hostile enemy and staging
base, Korea is an issue to be exploited solely to get the U.S.
forces out, and Russia is isolated in Northeast Asia.112
Aleksin was not alone in confirming that military threat
scenarios based on absolute worst-case scenarios persist.
Bolyatko, too, conceded that worst-case scenario planning for
Asian military contingencies continues in the Army and Strategic
Nuclear Forces.113 The conformity to Aleksin's approach is not
accidental. Military spokesmen consistently reiterate that the
real threat is U.S. naval, air, and strategic superiority and if
the United States would just reduce its arms and adhere to
Russia's concept of Asian collective security, all would be
well.114 Military threat assessments and political pronouncements
ignore their broader implications for national interests and
continue casting Russia's Far East interests in essentially
military terms with scenarios of hostility and constant Russian
victimization. The traditional view that the region is constantly
threatened by the United States, Japan, and possibly China,
combined with a visibly racist attitude toward Japan and China
and arrogant, overt disdain of Japanese interests, prevents a
constructive approach to Asia. As a result, virtually every
Russian security proposal in the last 30 years has been spurned
by Asia and the United States because they are all so obviously
self-serving and anti-American. Persistence in this error will
not win friends and influence in Asia.
The dominance of the militarizing view in Russian Asia
saddles it with a regional military force that it cannot afford
to either support or withdraw lest it create a further flight of
population from the area. Consequently, its military decline goes
on unabated.115 Paradoxically, the primacy of the militarizing
view in policy ensures that those forces which are available in
Russian Asia are insupportable and are steadily declining in

their combat effectiveness.
Where this militarizing mindset flourishes and the
government cannot control commanders' political activity, the
latter find it easy and tempting to engage with various political
coalitions for policies favoring their corporate interests and
promote those interests as national ones. Accordingly,
factionalism and fragmentation overlap with Russia's incoherent
policy process and allow for the unlimited intervention of
military officers into the political process.
The rise of the conservatives since 1992 has consolidated
the supremacy of the militarizing view in Asian policy and is
directly traceable to the success enjoyed by the coalition of
nationalists, military officers, and anti-reformers against
normalization of ties with Japan and return of the Kurile
Islands. The military publicly advanced arguments of dubious
strategic value and played upon the notion of racism against
Japan and the U.S.-Japanese threat, while local politicians in
Sakhalin, led by Governor Fedorov, and anti-reformers attacked
the idea and the policy of normalization. Their intense
opposition forced Yeltsin to cancel his visit to Tokyo in 1992
and arrested the forward movement of the reform campaign. The
decision to forego rapprochement with Japan has had
"incalculable" consequences for returning Russia to the road of
Realpolitik and away from reform.116
Accordingly, friendship with Japan has become progressively
more difficult to achieve and bilateral relations remain very
cold. It has been impossible for any Russian government to
approach Tokyo in a spirit of reconciliation and normalization.
To complicate matters, Russia keeps acting provocatively against
Tokyo even as it pushes for a better relationship and a way to
address the Kurile Islands issue.117 The failure to normalize
relations with Japan means that Russia cannot hope for extensive
Japanese foreign investment or political support, both of which
are essential for Russia's recovery in Asia. Japanese investment
and political support for Russia is now held hostage to hostile
domestic forces who have the upper hand, have already tasted
blood, and will not hesitate to do so again.
The victory of the "militarizing" viewpoint has innumerable
negative consequences. The supremacy of a world view couched only
in terms of 19th century Realpolitik means that "new thinking"
that can ensure domestic reform cannot prevail. The notion that
Russia is under permanent worldwide military threat makes it
impossible for liberal views and policies to take hold in the
elite's, as well as the masses', political agendas. First of all,
when such rhetoric and views of world politics take precedence,
they distort Russian thinking and action in and about Asia,
inclining Moscow to emphasize military enemies. Second, the
militarizing view aligns a politicized and angry military with
retrogressive anti-reform forces at home. This alliance impedes
economic reform, democratization, and the enhancement of Russia's

security and world standing. It also hampers democratic control
of the armed forces and poisons domestic political rhetoric with
a strident, but prejudiced nationalism. Third, this mentality
frightens every other major player in Asia who is convinced that
Russia is either unreliable or not serious as a partner, is
uncommitted to reform, does not accept the collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1991, and has nothing constructive to say about Asia.
And it offers them excuses for not further demilitarizing their
forces that are qualitatively superior to Russia's (e.g., the
U.S. Navy, supposedly the greatest military threat to Russia).
Its primacy also prevents Japan from changing its mind about
Russia and opening up foreign investment to Russia and the
Russian Far East. The prevalence of the militarizing view
ultimately facilitates Russia's isolation and insecurity in Asia
while adding to its military weakness. Fourth, it reinforces the
strength of the anti-reform coalition at home by forcing Russia
to virtually ally itself with China for it has no other Asian
option. Thus a perfectly rational policy of friendship and
partnership with China is carried to an excessive length, where
support for each other's government becomes support for each
other's form of rule, confirming some of the more retrograde
thinkers in Russian and Chinese politics in their antiAmericanism. The militarizing view not only reflects and
reinforces the disarray at home; it also adds foreign
reinforcements to it and precludes Russia from achieving an Asian
place in the sun.
Unless and until a new approach to security that radically
diverges from this viewpoint is devised, Russia's prospects in
Asia will be bleak. Russian security must be built not on the
attributes of the militarizing view, but on the basis of its real
resources and the real threats it faces which are largely due to
its own economic-political crisis and inability to deal with it.
Thinking about security must proceed from the realistic
evaluation of Russia's true assets and deficits rather than from
the hallmarks of the militarizing approach and "old thinking."
Is Official Policy Changing?
The most recent developments strongly suggest a continuation
of these negative trends. Yeltsin's reelection in July 1996 did
not overcome the government's structural problems; rather the
election campaign and its outcome reinforced them. During this
campaign, the leadership of most agencies with responsibility for
national security was replaced as part of an ever more overt and
incessant factional struggle that Yeltsin has deliberately
fostered. In foreign policy, Primakov reasserted the classical
view that foreign policy must not be tailored to the realities of
Russia's internal condition but rather must create the conditions
favorable to resolving the most vital domestic needs.118 The
traditional and anachronistic view of the primacy of defense and
foreign policy still reigns supreme in policymakers' minds. Both
he and Yeltsin strongly reassert that Russia must pursue global
goals and interests even though the resources for them are just

not there. For example, Bolyatko observes that not only is
wholesale modernization of Russia's Pacific-based nuclear forces
(land and sea-based) beyond Moscow's means, but doing so would
also awaken Chinese suspicions of Russian aims, something that
must be avoided at all costs.119 Nor can Moscow support its armed
forces in Russian Asia.
These analyses suggest that Russia's state crisis, excessive
partiality to China, and the primacy of policymakers' traditional
attitudes toward Asia can only lead Russia to a dead end. Yet
this insight seems to elude Russian policymakers. Apart from the
examples cited above, we can quote from the leaked national
security document of June 1996 which stated:
Russia must attentively study different variants of
cooperation with Asian-Pacific countries, including
China. Such an alliance (emphasis author) could help
create a unique self-sufficient system with enormous
potential for development and cooperation and a large
internal market, which would be able to conduct
independent and efficient foreign policy towards any
other geopolitical systems (emphasis author). That is
why strengthening and developing trade, production,
scientific, military, political and cultural relations
with Asian-Pacific countries must be considered a major
political and, above all, economic strategic task for
Russia.120
All these signs point to a policy whose north star is
harmonizing relations with China, hardly a manifestation of a
strategic concept based on a clear vision of Russian interests.
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Chinese diplomats and
media incite Russian opposition to NATO expansion and the United
States; and Russian observers and journalists talk of "objective
factors" impelling economic and military cooperation with
China.121 This reasoning signifies a subcontracting of Russian
Asian policy to Beijing and the imperatives of arms
manufacturers, not a well-thought-out policy that strengthens
Russia's truly independent capacity to exert influence. Russia
may court South Korea with trade and ASEAN with arms, but they,
as well as North Korea, remain skeptical of Russian policy.
Consequently, the return on Russia's investment in arms sales and
its on again, off again, equidistance from both Koreas is
meager.122
Conclusions.
Yeltsin has not used the 5 years of his first term
successfully or sagely insofar as defining a stable role for
Russia in Asia is concerned. Instead, his own policies have made
a bad situation worse. He has deliberately cultivated a style
that fragments political authority and all but precludes the
formulation of coherent policy. As a result, too much of Asia

policy (if not policy in general) is in the hands of sectoral or
factional lobbies who invoke the precepts of "old thinking" to
pursue private gain, e.g., unrestricted arms sales with no
thought for Russian interests, or the mindless pursuit of
chauvinistic aims even where they antagonize key actors like
Japan. As a result, in Northeast Asia the United States takes no
heed of Russian interests. South Korea is losing interest in
Russia and does not take it as seriously as in the past. North
Korea, too, remains dubious about Moscow. Japan, for its part, is
frozen in a wary stance toward Russia and remains unwilling to
lead the Asian economy into massive involvement in the Russian
Far East. Due to these factors, Russia is slouching toward an
excessive dependence on Chinese policies and leadership in areas
where Beijing could easily provoke serious crises that Russia
would then be unable to avoid. Russia could, for example, end up
involved in areas such as the Spratly Islands or Taiwan where
vital Russian interests are not engaged. Not only is policymaking
crippled and Russia's regional standing impaired, the instruments
of policy, too, are not being improved. Despite massive economic
change, Asiatic Russia remains more backward than it should be
and less connected to world or Asian trade than it could be.
Consequently, conventional and nuclear force modernization is
impossible for reasons of fiscal stringency and because Russia is
excessively wedded to China. Conventional force modernization has
also stagnated due to bad policy regarding the defense industry
and the failure to devise effective military reform. That
failure, in itself, owes much to the failure to control the
military and build a coherent state structure and policy process.
In the end it is the Russian state's ability to create a viable
and legitimate order that ensures a prominent place in Asia. At
present, Asia knows that and Russia does not. Asia is outpacing
Russia for the first time in history and no longer needs Russian
tutelage, examples, or leadership. In short, while Russia needs
Asia more than ever to climb out of its crises, Asia needs Russia
less than ever. Unless Russia can draw the appropriate
consequences from this state of affairs, its crisis and
marginality in Asia will continue with profoundly disruptive
consequences for everyone.
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